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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960606-CA 
Vv : Priority No. 2 
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a judgment and conviction pursuant to 
a conditional guilty plea to one count of computer crimes, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 
(1995). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court correctly rule that the computer 
crimes statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995) , did not contain 
the same elements or proscribe the same conduct as Utah's 
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud statutes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Vogt. 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following rules, statutes, and 
constitutional provisions is attached in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-501 (1995)/ 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 17, 1995, defendant was charged by information 
with two counts of computer crimes, second degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995) (R. 01-03). 
Defendant moved to strike the computer crimes statute as being 
unconstitutional on the ground that it proscribed the same 
conduct as Utah's forgery, insurance fraud, and communications 
fraud statutes, but imposed a harsher penalty (R. 20-24). The 
trial court denied defendant's motion on the ground that the 
elements of the four statutes were distinguishable (R. 75-76). 
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of computer crimes, expressly reserving the right to appeal 
the trial court's denial of her constitutional and statutory 
challenge (R. 47, 50, 76-77). The trial court accepted the plea 
and sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in prison, stayed 
2 
on the condition that defendant successfully complete 36 months 
of probation (R. 59, 91). Defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R. 65). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime from March 2, through March 9, 1995, defendant 
Simone Kent used another employee's password to access the 
computer system of her employer, First Health, and to alter two 
insurance claim forms on the system (R. 02-03). Defendant's 
alterations resulted in two checks, one for $3500.00 and one for 
$7500.00, being issued and mailed to Cathleen Gullett at a post 
office box that defendant had rented using Gullett's driver's 
license (R. 02-03) . First Health discovered the scheme and 
notified authorities of the unauthorized checks (R. 02-03) . 
Defendant was arrested as she retrieved the $3500.00 check from 
the post office box (R. 02-03). 
The State charged defendant with two counts of computer 
crimes (R. 01-02). The first count was based on the issuance of 
the $3500.00 check, while the second count referred to the 
issuance of the $7500.00 check (R. 01-02). After the trial court 
denied defendant's motion to strike the computer crimes statute, 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the first count 
3 
(R. 47, 50, 76-77). In exchange for defendant's plea# the State 
agreed to dismiss the second count (R. 77). 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Point I, The computer crimes statute, under which defendant 
was charged and convicted, does not proscribe the same conduct as 
the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud statutes. 
Each of the four statutes was intended to target distinct conduct 
and each contains elements that are separate and distinct from 
the others. Therefore, defendant's equal protection and due 
process rights were not violated, and the trial court properly 
denied her motion to strike the computer crimes statutes. 
Point II. Defendant waived her argument that she is 
entitled to a lesser penalty merely because the mental 
culpability for forgery, insurance fraud, and communications 
fraud equals or exceeds the mental culpability required by the 
computer crimes statute. Even if she did not waive this 
argument, the case law she relies on does not support her 
position. 
Point III. Even though an act violates more than one 
statute, the misconduct may be subject to the more severe penalty 
so long as the legislative classification is not arbitrary and 
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there is a rational basis for the distinction. There is a 
rational basis for punishing a computer crime more severely than 
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud. Computer 
crimes are easy to commit and difficult to detect. Furthermore, 
the computer crimes statutes applies more specifically to 
defendant's conduct in this case than do the other three 
statutes. Indeed, the factual record indicates that the elements 
of forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud could not 
have been proven in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant makes three arguments on appeal. First, defendant 
asserts that the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications 
fraud statutes all proscribe the same conduct as the statute 
under which she was convicted and that she is therefore entitled 
to the lesser penalty imposed by those statutes. Second, 
defendant argues that she is entitled to the lesser penalties of 
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud because the 
requisite mental culpability of those crimes equals or exceeds 
the requisite mental culpability for computer crimes. Third, 
defendant contends that because her conduct is also punishable 
under the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud, she 
is entitled to the lesser penalty imposed by those statutes. 
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Otherwise, defendant asserts, the prosecutor would be permitted 
to choose whether to charge her with a second or a third degree 
felony, thereby denying her equal protection under the law. 
The State addresses each of defendant's contentions in 
order. 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE DOES NOT HAVE THE 
SAME ELEMENTS AS UTAH'S POROERY, COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, 
OR INSURANCE FRAUD STATUTES, THESE STATUTES DO NOT 
PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT AND DEFENDANT COULD PROPERLY 
BE CONVICTED UNDER THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE. 
Defendant asserts that the computer crimes statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995), proscribes the same conduct as that 
proscribed in the forgery statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1995) ; the insurance fraud statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 
(1995)/ and the communications fraud statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1) (1995). Defendant argues that this violates her 
equal protection and due process rights because the computer 
crimes statute, under which she was charged and convicted, 
carries a harsher penalty than the other statutes.1 
Computer crimes is a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-703(3), whereas at the time defendant was sentenced forgery, 
insurance fraud, and communications fraud were all third degree 
felonies, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(3) (1995 & Supp. 1995); 76-
6-521(2) (b) (1995); 76-10-1801 (1) (c) (1995 & Supp. 1995). 
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Under State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and its 
progeny, if two statutes proscribe the same conduct but assess 
different penalties, the defendant is entitled to receive the 
lesser penalty. Shondal. 453 P.2d at 147-48; gee alSQ State Y, 
Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); f^.af* v. Gomez. 722 P.2d 
747, 749 (Utah 1986); at at a v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 
1981); gee also State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989). 
Otherwise, the same conduct would be "subject to different 
penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a 
prosecutor chooses to charge." Bryan. 709 P.2d at 263. That 
would violate a defendant's right to equal protection under the 
laws. Id*, at 263; Shondel. 453 P.2d at 147; State v. TwitChell, 
333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1959). 
The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the 
same conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative 
as to the elements of the crime.1' Brya^r 709 P.2d at 263; see 
also Gomez. 722 P.2d at 749; Duran. 722 P.2d at 987. If the 
elements of the crimes are not identical and the two statutes 
require "proof of some fact or element not required to establish 
the other," they do not proscribe the same conduct and the 
defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more severe 
7 
penalty. Clark, 632 P.2d at 844; see also fiQm&a, 722 P.2d at 
749-50; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 61 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)• 
Thus, the issue here is whether the computer crimes statute 
has the identical elements contained in the forgery, 
communications fraud, and insurance fraud statutes. A comparison 
of the individual statutes demonstrates that it does not. 
A. The elements of the computer Crimea and forgery statutes 
are not identical. 
Although computer crimes and forgery fall within the same 
general category of fraud crimes, they have separate and distinct 
elements that proscribe very different conduct. A person is 
guilty of a computer crime if he or she 
uses or knowingly allows another person to use any 
computer, computer network, computer property, or 
computer system, program, or software to devise or 
execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain 
money, property, services, or other things of value by 
false pretenses, promises, or representations, is 
guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (1995). Thus, the elements that the 
State must prove to convict a defendant of computer crimes are: 
1) a person must use or knowingly allow another person to use a 
computer or computer system 2) to devise or execute an artifice 
or scheme 3) to defraud or obtain money, services, property, or 
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something of value, 4) by false pretenses, promises, or 
representations. 
In comparison, forgery consists of the following: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(b) makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, 
issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the 
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, 
or to be a copy of an original when no such 
original exists. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1)(b) (1995). Simply stated, the 
elements of forgery relevant to this case are that one must 1) 
1
 I 
with the intent to defraud 2) utter a writing 3) so that the 
writing or the uttering of the writing purports to be that of 
another or purports to have been executed at a time or place or 
in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case. For 
purposes of the forgery statute, a writing includes "printing or 
any other method of recording information, checks, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any 
other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification." 
9 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2) (1995).* 
Each of these statutes requires proof of some fact or 
element not required by the other. Forgery requires the making, 
completing, execution, authenticating, or the uttering of a 
writing. The computer crimes statute has no such requirement. 
Forgery requires that the writing or the utterance of the writing 
purport to be the act of another or purport to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in 
defendant states in her brief that the forgery statute 
defines "writing" as including "electronic storage or 
transmission." (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br. App."] at 
13). That language, however, was not added to the forgery 
statute until April 29, 1996, more than a year after defendant 
committed her crime, and five months after defendant was charged. 
See Amendment Notes, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (1995 & Supp. 
1996). Defendant clearly could not have been charged under the 
1996 version of the forgery statute; therefore the definition of 
"writing'1 existing at the time defendant committed her crimes 
controls for purposes of comparing the elements of forgery and 
computer crimes. 
Although a statutory amendment may be applied retroactively 
when enacted solely to clarify ambiguities in the law, D.B. v. 
State. 925 P.2d 178, 182 n.5 (Utah App. 1996), "[t]his exception 
carries a rebuttable presumption that amendments not expressly 
characterized as clarifications are intended to change existing 
legal rights and liabilities." Kofoed v. Industrial Comm'n. 872 
P.2d 484, 486 (Utah App. 1994). The prior forgery statute was 
not ambiguous as to the definition of a writing and the amendment 
was not expressly characterized as a clarification. There is no 
reason therefore to support the conclusion that the amendment was 
merely a clarification. 
Unless otherwise specified, all future references to 
applicable statutes in the State's brief are to those versions 
existing at the time defendant committed her crime. 
10 
fact the case. One may use a computer to steal without producing 
any writing that purports to be the act of another or to have 
I 
been executed at a falsely stated time and place. For example, a 
person may access a computer system and wrongfully transfer funds 
from another's account, or steal proprietary information, or, as 
was done in this case, simply direct the computer to issue 
unauthorized checks. None of these actions produces a writing as 
defined by the applicable version of the forgery statute, let 
alone a writing that purports to be the act of another.3 
Finally, while a computer crime requires the use of a computer, 
forgery can, and often is, committed without the use of a 
computer. 
Because both these statutes contain necessary elements not 
shared by the other, they are not "wholly duplicative." See 
Bryan 709 P.2d at 263. These statues therefore do not proscribe 
the same conduct. The trial court correctly ruled that defendant 
defendant implies in her brief that the check issued by her 
employer to Cathleen Gullett fulfills the "writing" requirement 
of the forgery statute. While a check is a "writing" for 
purposes of the forgery statute, in this case it was not a 
writing that purported to be anything other than it was, a check 
from First Health to Cathleen Gullett. Furthermore, defendant 
did not make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, or utter 
the check as required by the statute. Rather, by altering the 
claim forms, she caused First Health to make and issue the check. 
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was not entitled to the lesser penalty under the forgery statute. 
£L Computer crimes and insurance fraud do not share 
identical elements-
The elements of computer crimes are also very distinct from 
the elements of a fraudulent insurance act* To commit insurance 
fraud one must 1) with the intent to defraud 2) present or cause 
to be presented any oral or written representation 3) as part of 
or in support of a claim for payment or other benefit 4) pursuant 
to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, 5) knowing that 
the representation contains false or fraudulent information 
concerning any material fact or thing to the claim, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-521(1)(b).4 Unlike insurance fraud, a computer crime 
does not require that a false representation be presented in 
support of a claim for payment pursuant to an insurance policy. 
4Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521(1)(b) states in full: 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that 
person with intent to defrauds 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral 
or written statement or representation as part of 
or in support of a claim for payment or other 
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, 
certificate, or contract, or in connection with 
any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages 
for personal or bodily injuries or property 
damage, knowing that the statement or 
representation contains false or fraudulent 
information concerning any fact or thing material 
to the claim. 
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Indeed, a computer crime does not require any representation at 
all. Rather, to commit a computer crime, one must merely use a 
computer to devise or execute a scheme to defraud another. That 
may be accomplished without making any false representation and 
without regard to the existence of a claim for payment pursuant 
to an insurance policy or contract. Insurance fraud, on the 
other hand, does not make the use of a computer a necessary 
element. 
Also, by their terms, the computer crimes and insurance 
fraud statutes target different criminal conduct. The computer 
crimes statute proscribes the use of a computer to defraud anyone 
else. The insurance fraud statute on the other hand aims to 
punish those who file false claims with insurance companies 
pursuant to insurance policies or contracts. 
Because the elements of these two statutes are not 
identical, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion. 
C. The elements of computer crimes and communications fraud 
ar* not identical. 
Although the computer crimes and communications fraud 
statutes are similar and proscribe related conduct, their 
elements are not "wholly duplicative." Bryan. 709 P.2d at 263. 
A person is guilty of communications fraud if he or she has 
13 
[1] devised any scheme or artifice [2] to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property or 
anything of value [3] by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises or material 
omissions, and [4] who communicates directly or 
indirectly with any person [5] by any means [6] for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). For purposes of this statute, to 
communicate wmeans to bestow, convey, make known, recount, 
impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a). Means 
of communication under this statute include, but are not limited 
to, "use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, 
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (6) (b). 
The most obvious difference between these two statutes is 
that communications fraud requires a direct or indirect 
communication with a person for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme to defraud another. In contrast, the 
computer crimes statute does not require any communication. A 
person can commit a computer crime without communicating anything 
to anyone. As already mentioned, a person could access a 
computer system and simply steal proprietary information, or 
alter existing information to reflect that payment had been made 
14 
on a debt, or one could simply direct a computer by altering 
existing information to issue checks or something else of value 
i 
to that person. Such acts do not involve ^communicating directly 
or indirectly with any person • . . for the purpose of executing 
or concealing the scheme or artifice.1' 
It is significant that computer crimes has as a necessary 
element "the use of a computer" to defraud. Although one may 
I I 
commit communications fraud by communication via a computer, the 
use of the computer is not an element of communications fraud. 
Rather, it is only one of numerous ways that one can communicate 
to another for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
fraudulent scheme or artifice. 
Because communications fraud and computer crimes do not 
share the same elements, the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion that she be given the benefit of the lesser 
penalty imposed by the communications fraud statute. 
15 
POINT IX 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HER ARGUMENT THAT UNDER STATE V, 
fi&XAH SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE LESSER PENALTIES IMPOSED 
BY FORGERY, INSURANCE FRAUD, AND COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
BECAUSE THEIR REQUISITE MENTAL CULPABILITY EQUALS OR 
EXCEEDS THE MENTAL CULPABILITY REQUIRED FOR COMPUTER 
CRIMES. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STATE V, BRYAN DOBS NOT 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT. 
Relying on isolated language in State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 
257, 262 (Utah 1985), defendant argues that because the requisite 
mental culpability for forgery, insurance fraud, and 
communications fraud equals or exceeds the mental culpability 
required by the computer crimes statute, it would be more fair to 
sentence her to the lesser penalty prescribed by the other 
statutes. Defendant waived this argument because she did not 
raise it below, and, in any event, her argument is not supported 
by Bryan. 
A. Defendant has waived this argument, because she did 
not preserve it below. 
When defendant moved the trial court to find the computer 
crimes statute unconstitutional, she argued only that the 
computer crimes, forgery, insurance fraud, and communications 
fraud statutes punished equivalent acts and that this violated 
her equal protection and due process rights (R. 20-23) • She made 
no mention, let alone argument, that she was entitled to be 
16 
convicted of a third degree felony because the requisite mental 
culpability for forgery, insurance fraud, and communications 
I I 
fraud equals or exceeds that for computer crimes (R. 20-23). As 
a result, the trial court did not address this issue in making 
its ruling (R. 75-76). 
It is well settled that absent plain error or 
exceptional circumstances, an appellate court will not address an 
I I 
issue raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 
P.2d 1105, 1113, (Utah 1994); State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568, 569 
(Utah 1987); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986). 
I 
The purpose of this rule is to give the trial court an 
opportunity to fully consider and correct an error that might be 
I 
claimed by appellant on appeal. Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 95-
96 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant has not claimed plain error or any exceptional 
I 
circumstance that prohibited her from bringing this issue to the 
attention of the trial court. Defendant has therefore waived the 
issue and this Court should not address it. 
B. Bryan does not support defendant'a argument!. 
If the Court determines that defendant did not waive this 
issue, it should nevertheless affirm the trial court because 
defendant's argument is not supported by Bryan or any other 
1? 
authority. 
Defendant asserts that the Utah Supreme Court in Bryan *has 
recognized that the differences in the %grade' of offenses (i.e» 
from class C to A misdemeanors, and third to first degree 
felonies) are manifested by the increasingly culpable mental 
states of the offenses.* (Br. App. at 9, citing Bryan. 709 P.2d 
at 262.) Defendant bases this assertion on two sentences 
appearing in Bryan; "Our justice system contemplates a series of 
graded offenses that [are] distinguished by increasingly culpable 
mental states. If the State can prove that a defendant acted 
with the more culpable mental state, the defendant can be 
convicted of the higher offense." id. Defendant seems to 
conclude from this language that if the mental culpability of a 
criminal statute equals or exceeds the mental culpability of a 
statute proscribing related conduct but imposing a harsher 
penalty, the defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty. (Br. 
App. at 9-10, 13, 15,17.) 
The defendant in Bryan was convicted of manslaughter because 
he caused the death of two young persons while driving 
intoxicated. Applying the Shonde], rule, the Court compared the 
elements of manslaughter with the elements of negligent homicide 
as defined in the criminal code [hereinafter "automobile 
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homicide"]. The Court held that manslaughter and automobile 
homicide did not have identical elements because they each 
i 
i 
required a different mens rea: manslaughter required recklessness 
and automobile homicide required only criminal negligence, id. 
at 262. The Court explained that this difference required that 
the State prove "something more than the elements of automobile 
homicide to convict defendant of manslaughter." id. The Court 
concluded that if the State could prove that the defendant acted 
with the more culpable state, i.e., recklessness, then the 
defendant could be convicted of the higher offense, i.e., 
manslaughter. Id. 
The Bryan Court then compared the elements of manslaughter 
with the elements of negligent homicide as defined in the motor 
vehicle code [hereinafter "negligent homicide"]. Id. at 263. 
The Court concluded that the elements of the two statutes were 
identical because each required the "reckless" killing of 
another, id. Holding that this would impermissibly allow a 
prosecutor to charge a felony or a misdemeanor, the Court held 
that defendant was entitled to be sentenced under the lesser 
offense. Id. at 263-64. 
The holding in Bryan rested solely on the rule in Shondel 
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that when two statutes have identical elements, they proscribe 
the same conduct and the defendant is entitled to the lesser 
punishment, id. at 262-63. The statement relied on by 
defendant, that graded offenses are ^distinguished by 
increasingly culpable mental states," was merely an explanation 
regarding the distinction in that case between the manslaughter 
and automobile homicide statutes, id. at 262. It was not 
intended to state a blanket rule that all offenses are determined 
solely by culpable mental states. Read in context, it was 
certainly not intended to entitle a defendant to the lesser 
penalty of two related statutes simply because the lesser offense 
has a mental culpability that equals or exceeds the higher 
offense. 
Thus, under Bryan and Shondel. the only relevant inquiry 
with respect to mental culpability is whether two statutes with 
the same actus reus share the same mens rea. Indeed, under 
Shondel and Bryan, if the mental states of forgery, insurance 
fraud, and communications fraud are greater than that required by 
the computer crimes statutes, their elements are different and 
they do not proscribe the same conduct. 




DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER THE COMPUTER 
CRIMES STATUTE EVEN IF HER CONDUCT WAS PUNISHABLE BY* 
THE FORGERY, INSURANCE FRAUD, AND COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
STATUTES. 
Defendant finally argues that her conduct is punishable 
under the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud 
statutes, as well as the computer crimes statues. She asserts 
that under Bryan and Shondel, this overlap permits a prosecutor, 
in violation of equal protection, to charge her with either a 
third degree felony under the computer crimes statute, or with a 
second degree felony under the forgery, insurance fraud, or 
communications fraud statues. (Br. App. at 10-11, 14, 16, 17) . 
Defendant also argues that the forgery, insurance fraud, and 
communications fraud statutes are more specifically tailored to 
the facts of this case than is the computer crimes statute and 
that any doubt on this point should be resolved in her favor. 
A. Even though an act mav violate more than one statutory 
provision, a defendant mav be punished under the more severe 
applicable penalty, SQ long as there is a rational basis for 
the legislative clasaification. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already considered and rejected 
defendant's argument that because her conduct violates more than 
one statutory provision, she is entitled to be convicted under 
the lesser offense- Clark. 632 P.2d at 843-44. In Clark, the 
21 
defendant was convicted of theft of livestock for stealing three 
turkeys valued at $45.00. Clark's conduct was punishable under 
both the theft of livestock statute and the theft statute. Theft 
of livestock was a third degree felony regardless of the value of 
the livestock. Theft, however, was a misdemeanor if the value of 
the stolen property was less than $100.00. Clark argued, as the 
defendant does here, that the provisions of the theft statue gave 
a prosecutor discretion to charge defendant with either a 
misdemeanor or a felony for the same act and that this violated 
his right to equal protection under the law. Id. at 843. 
The Court rejected defendant's argument, holding that u[i]t 
is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more severe 
penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is 
imposed with respect to the general category of crimes to which 
the special crime is related or of which it is a subcategory.1' 
Id. The Court explained that so long as the legislative 
distinction is not arbitrary, "the fact that conduct may violate 
both a general and a specific provision of the criminal laws does 
not render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one 
violation is subject to a greater sentence." id. (citing to 
People v. Burns. 593 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1979). The Clark Court 
elaborated: 
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"Simply because an act may violate more than one 
statutory provision does not invalidate the legislation 
in question, so long as the legislative classification 
is not arbitrary or unreasonable, and the differences 
in the provisions bear a reasonable relationship to the 
persons included and the public policy to be achieved." 
IdL at 844 (quoting People Vt CzajkQWSki, 568 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo. 
1977)). 
The Court then concluded that the difference between the 
penalties for theft of livestock and general theft crimes rested 
on a "rational distinction" in that the "theft of certain animals 
is one which has historically been recognized as furthering the 
legitimate purpose of determining a type of theft easy to commit 
and difficult to detect." Id. at 843; see also Gomez. 722 P.2d 
at 749-50 (distinction that "signing" of card or sales slip 
should be punished more severely than mere fraudulent use of 
financial transaction card was within legislative prerogative); 
State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1982) (distinction 
between destruction of public records by custodian of records and 
destruction of public records by any person was a rational one); 
Duran, 772 P.2d at 987 (distinction between assault by a prisoner 
and assault of a peach officer by any person was "manifestly 
rational"). 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant's conduct is also 
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punishable under the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications 
fraud statutes, there is a rational basis for imposing a more 
severe penalty for committing a computer crime. Our society has 
become increasingly dependent on the use of computers. Computers 
are used to store important data and to perform various necessary 
financial and business functions. Like theft of livestock, using 
a computer to steal or defraud is easy to do and extremely 
difficult to detect. Forgery, insurance fraud, and 
communications fraud, on the other hand, are, because of the 
nature of their crimes, more easily detected. For example, 
forgery involves writings that can be examined and verified. The 
origins of forged documents can almost always be traced. 
Insurance fraud requires a false representation in support of a 
claim made pursuant to an existing policy. The representations 
in support of the claim can be verified and false statements can 
easily be exposed. In addition, it is an easy matter to trace 
the source of false representations on claims. Similarly, 
communications fraud requires a communication to someone, thereby 
providing a means of identifying the person perpetrating the 
fraud. In contrast, a computer crime is essentially a faceless 
crime. One can easily access a computer and steal something of 
value with no one the wiser and with no way to identify the 
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thief. One can also afterward delete from the computer any 
evidence of the wrongdoing. Finally, the computer may also be 
the means to defraud on a much grander scale than what otherwise 
might be possible without the use of a computer. 
For these reasons, the legislature reasonably placed a more 
severe penalty for defrauding others by use of a computer. 
Therefore, defendant could properly be charged and convicted 
under the computer crimes statute, even though her conduct might 
also be punishable under the lesser penalties for forgery, 
insurance fraud, and communications fraud. 
B. On the factual record of this cage, computer crimes 
is the statute that most specifically applies to 
defendant's conduct. 
Defendant argues that her conduct is more specifically 
covered by forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud, 
than it is by computer crimes. Defendant further suggests that 
any doubt about which statute applies to her conduct should be 
resolved in her favor. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, computer crimes is the 
statute that most specifically applies to her conduct. Indeed, 
it is the only statute whose elements are established by this 
record. The record clearly reflects that defendant used a 
computer to execute a scheme to defraud her employer (R.02-03). 
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Defendant does not dispute this, nor that her conduct falls 
squarely under the computer crimes statute. 
The record does not state, however, that defendant made or 
uttered a writing purporting to be that of another. The record 
merely states that she accessed her employer's computer and 
altered two claim forms (R. 02-03). These facts do not tell us 
that a "writing" purporting to be that of another was produced. 
As already stated above in Point I, footnote 3, the check issued 
as a result of defendant's misconduct did not purport to be the 
writing of another or to be executed at a different time or 
place. In fact, there is no evidence that defendant made or 
executed the check as required by the forgery statute. The check 
was produced by First Health as a result of defendant's altering 
the claim forms. Also, the altering of forms on the computer 
does not fit within the definition of a "writing" under the 
forgery statute. Even if it did, the facts on this record does 
not tell us exactly how defendant altered the forms. Thus, we do 
not know whether that alteration resulted in a form that 
purported to be that of another or to be executed at a different 
time or place. There is also nothing in the record that states 
that anyone ever saw this purported "writing" by the defendant. 
On these record facts, therefore, defendant could not have been 
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convicted of forgery. 
Similarly, the record facts of this case do not meet the 
elements of insurance fraud. A critical element of insurance 
fraud is that a defendant present a false representation in 
support of a claim pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, 
or contract. Nothing in the record of this case indicates that 
defendant made a false representation when she directed the 
computer to issue the two checks. The record merely states that 
she altered two forms so that the checks would be issued and 
mailed.5 The record does not reflect exactly what alterations 
defendant made and whether those alterations entailed a false 
representation or merely involved altering a code. It is also 
5In the plea agreement, defendant admits to the following: 
My conduct for which I am criminally liable, which 
constitutes the elements of the crime charged is as 
follows: I acknowledge and admit that on or about March 
2, 1995 through March 9, 1995 in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, I did commit Computer Crimes when I 
used my position at my job at First Health to enter the 
company's computer system and filed medical claims for 
2 checks in the amounts of $3,800 and $7,600. I was 
not entitled to those checks, and was caught by agents 
of the FBI and Postal Inspectors Office when I tried to 
pick up one of the checks as it was delivered to a post 
office box which I had rented. 
(R. 47-48). This statement still does not clarify exactly what 
representations defendant made on the claim forms, if any, 
whether those representations were false, and whether they were 
made pursuant to an existing policy or contract. 
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questionable whether accessing a computer and altering a claim 
form on the computer amounts to a representation at all. There 
is no evidence on this record that anyone actually read or saw 
the claim forms that defendant altered or that they were ever 
reduced to a written form. The record also does not indicate 
that defendant or anyone else made a claim pursuant to any 
insurance policy, certificate, or contract. Without more facts, 
defendant could not have been convicted under the insurauice fraud 
statute. 
Finally, nothing on this record indicates that defendant 
actually, either directly or indirectly, communicated, i.e., 
bestowed, conveyed, made known, recounted, imparted, gave by way 
of information, talked over, or transmitted information, uwith 
any person," as required by the communications fraud statute. A 
computer can hardly be considered a person and under this record, 
defendant merely input or altered data already in the computer. 
Nothing in the record indicates that anyone read or saw that data 
or that defendant communicated with any person for the purpose of 
executing or covering up her fraud. In the absence of such 
evidence, the State could not have proven that defendant was 
guilty of communications fraud. 
In sum, on this record, computer crimes was the only statute 
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under which defendant could have been convicted. Even if this 
Court were to find that defendant's conduct is punishable under 
forgery, insurance fraud, or communications fraud, it should 
nevertheless uphold defendant's conviction because of the four 
statutes, the computer crimes statute is the most applicable, and 
more importantly, the legislature had a rational basis for 
imposing a more severe penalty for violating that statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the elements of computer crimes and forgery, 
insurance fraud, and communications fraud are not the same, they 
do not proscribe the same conduct. This Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to strike the 
computer crimes statute. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 2?day of March, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
/ ? * U(M)a^k 
B. Dupaix 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-6-501 CRIMINAL CODE 
Kimbel 620 R2d 516 (Utah 1980). 
Valuation of stolen property. 
Where auto owner took his car from posses-
mon of TtpBirman by trick, or otherwise stole 
special property of bailee, value was amount of 
indebtedness; where thing stolen was written 
instrument evidencing debt, its value was de-
termined by amount remaining unpaid 
thereon. State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23,137 P.2d 
626 (1943). 
Stealing of purse which was 1 Vfc feet from 
owner was not grand larceny in absence of proof 
of value. SUte •. Lucsro, 28 Utah 2d 61, 498 
P.2d 350 (1972). 
For purposes of determining the degree of an 
offense graded in terms of the value of the 
property stolen, the proper measure is the 
current market value of the property at the 
time and place where the alleged offense was 
committed. State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 
1977). 
Evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that more than $250 had been 
stolen from washers and dryers in a coin-
operated laundromat where laundromat owner, 
who had operated the business for twelve 
years, testified that roughly $600 to $800 was 
missing based upon estimates from money in 
the machines that were not disturbed and the 
total amount of money found in defendant's 
possession was nearly $600. State v. Whitten-
back, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). 
The prima facie value of a stolen check is its 
face value whether the check is endorsed or not 
SUte v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981). 
Evidence held sufficient to esUblish at least 
$260 embezzled by theater manager. SUU v. 
Patterson, 700 P. 2d 1104 (Utah 1985). 
lb prove market value in a different city, the 
cities must be sufficiently close geographically 
and similar in population to be considered 
comparable for purposes of valuing the prop-
erty. SUU v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
—Taetimony of owner. 
Owner is competent to testify to the value of 
stolen property where the owner's opinion of 
the value is based on comparable prices for 
similar property. SUU v. limb, 581 P.2d 142 
(Utah 1978). 
Owner of the stolen property was allowed to 
give his opinion as to the value of such property. 
SUU v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar 
with the value of his possessions, an owner is 
competent to testify on the present market 
value of his property. SUU v. Purceli, 711 R2d 
243 (Utah 1985). 
Owner's testimony that a stolen ring was 
worth $200 was inadmissible, because he had 
no independent knowledge or memory of iu 
value nor was his memory refreshed after look-
ing at a police report. SUU v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 
474 (Utah Ct App. 1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in SUU v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 
1986); SUU v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct 
App. 1987); SUU v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
(UtsJi 1987); SUU v. Branch, 743 P. 2d 1187 
(Ut*h 1987); SUU v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436 
(Ut*h Ct App. 1987); SUU v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 
1033 (Utah Ct App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur.2<L—»50Am Jur. 2d Larceny 5 44. 
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 60(1). 
Kay Numbers. — Larceny •» 23. 
PARTS 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) altors any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) maxes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub* 
lishes, or utters any writing so that the Writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
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numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing* includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or 
identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953,7*4-601, enacted by L. 
1973, eh* 196, I 76-6-601; 1974, ch. 33,1 19; 
1975, ch. 63,1 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Attempt 
Attorney signing client's name. 
Authority to use forged signature. 




Elements of offense. 







False pretenses distinguished. 
Fictitious name. 
Indictment or information. 
Intent 




—Authority to sign another's name. 






Where information charging offense of forg-
ery contained one count for forgery and another 
for uttering, attempt to utter could be shown. 
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was 
unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering or attempt-
ing to utter that was of evidentiary value. State 
v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936). 
The crime of attempted forgery involves the 
same culpability and dishonesty as does the 
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 
529 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Attorney signing client's name. 
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attor-
ney to execute documents in the name of a 
client does not authorize an attorney to forge a 
client's name to a negotiable instrument such 
as s settlement check and does not preclude the 
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of 
law when he does so; however, when an attor-
ney acts pursuant to the general authority 
granted by § 78-51-32 he may not later be 
convicted of forgery. State v. Musselman, 667 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Where defendant forged his accomplices 
name on checks which accomplice owned but 
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks 
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, 
defendant committed forgery as denned under 
Subsection (lXb), notwithstanding that the ac-
complice authorized defendant to sign his 
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 
1979). 
Classification of document 
The trial court erred in concluding that a 
"receipt" a document representing that a cua-
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76-6-520 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-520, Criminal usury. 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal usury when he knowingly engages in or 
directly or indirectly provides financing for the business of making loans at a 
higher rate of interest or consideration therefor than is authorized by law. 
(2) Criminal usury is a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-520, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, | 76-6420. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Amu Jur. 2d* — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and C.J.S. — 91 C.J.S. Usury § 160. 
Usury t 357. Key Numbers. — Usury *• 149. 
76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punish-
ment as for theft. 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent 
to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or 
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains 
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an appli-
cation for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or 
contract; 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement or 
representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other 
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in 
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for 
personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the state-
ment or representation contains false or fraudulent information concern-
ing any fact or thing material to the claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a fraudulent 
insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or artifice to 
obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (IXa) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d), is punishable as in 
the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud for 
property of like value. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of insurance fraud 
under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsections (1Kb) 
through (l)(d) shall be measxired by the total value of all property, money, or 
other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act 
or acts described in Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-521, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this see-
1973, ch-196, S 76-6-521; 1994, ch. 243, § 13* tion to such an extent that a detailed analysis is 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- impracticable. 
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76-6-702 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-702. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) •Access* means to directly or indirectly use, attempt to use, instruct, 
communicate with, cause input to, cause output from, or otherwise make 
use of any resources of a computer, computer system, computer network, 
or any means of communication with any of them. 
(2) "Computer" means any electronic device or communication facility 
with data processing ability. 
(3) 'Computer system* means a set of related, connected or uncon-
nected, devices, software, or other related computer equipment 
(4) "Computer network* means the interconnection of communication 
or telecommunication lines between computers or computers and remote 
terminals.' 
(5) "Computer property* includes, but is not limited to, electronic 
impulses, electronically produced data, information, financial instru-
ments, software, or programs, in either machine or human readable form, 
any other tangible or intangible item relating to a computer, computer 
system, computer network, and copies of any of them. 
(6) "Services" include, but are not limited to, computer time, data 
manipulation, and storage functions. 
(7) "Financial instrument* includes, but is not limited to, any check, 
draft, money order, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange, 
credit card, or marketable security. 
(8) "Software* or "program* means a series of instructions or statements 
in a form acceptable to a computer, relating to the operations of the 
computer, or permitting the functioning of a computer system in a manner 
designed to provide results including, but not limited to, system control 
programs, application programs, or copies of any of them. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 75, | 2; 1986, ch. 128, 
12 . 
76-6-703. Computer crimes and penalties. 
(1) A person who gains or attempts to gain access to and without authori-
zation intentionally, and to the damage of another, alters, damages, destroys, 
discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer property, 
computer system, program, or software is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) A person who intentionally and without authorization uses a computer, 
computer network, computer property, or computer system to gain or attempt 
to gain access to any other computer, computer network, computer property, or 
computer system, program, or software, to the damage of another, and alters, 
damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any of these, is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
(3) A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use any 
computer, computer network, computer property, or computer system, pro-
gram, or software to devise or execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to 
obtain money, property, services, or other things of value by false pretenses, 
promises, or representations, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
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(4) A person who intentionally, and without authorization, interferes with or 
interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(5) A person who intentionally and without authorization damages or 
destroys, in whole or in part, any computer, computer network, computer 
property, or computer system is guilty of a class A misdemeanor unless t ie 
amount of damage exceeds $1,000, in which case the person is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree. ^ 
History: C. IMS, 76-4-708, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 123, } 3 repeal* | 76-6-703, as e* 
1986, ch* 1*3,1 S. acted IqrUwt 1979, ch. 75, t 3, and enacu t h | 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws above section. ^ 
76-6-704. Attorney general, county attorney, or district] 
attorney to prosecute — Conduct violating other" 
statutes. \ 
(1) The attorney general, district attorney, or the county attorney shgll 
prosecute suspected criminal violations of this part 
(2) Prosecution under this part does not prevent any prosecutions under any 
other law. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 75,1 4; 1986, ch. 123, ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "district 
I 4; 1993, ch. 33,1 77. attorney" in Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
76-6-705. Reporting violations. 
Every person, except those to whom a statutory or common law privilege 
applies, who has reason to believe that the provisions of Section 76-6-703 are 
being or have been violated shall report the suspected violation to the attorney 
general, or county attorney, or, if within a prosecution district, the district 
attorney of the county or prosecution district in which part or all of the 
violations occurred 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-705, enacted by L. within a prosecution district the district sttpr-
1936, ch. 123,1 5; 1993, eh. 33,1 73. ney" and "or prosecution district" and m%de 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend* stylistic changes, 
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or, if 
PART 8 
LIBRARY T H E F T 
76-6-801. Acts c o n s t i t u t i n g l i b r a r y t h e f t 
A person is guilty of the crime of library theft when he willfully, for thi j 
purpose of converting to personal use, and depriving the owner, conceals on hii j 
person or among his belongings library materials while on the premises of thl" 
library or willfully and without authority removes library materials from the* 
library building with the intention of converting them to his own use. 
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PART 18 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penal-
ties* 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty oft 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not 
exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed 
$10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) Tb communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to 
talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
History: C. 1958, 76-10-1801, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 157,1 2; 1990, ch. 79,1 1. 
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